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INSIDE OUTSIDE LEAVE ME ALONE: DOMESTIC AND
EC-MOTIVATED REFORM IN THE UK SECURITIES
INDUSTRY
PA TRICK M. CREAVEN
INTRODUCTION
The United Kingdom ("U.K.") securities market has undergone ex-
tensive changes in the past decade. These changes have resulted from
both internal reforms and from external European Community ("EC")
mandates.
In the past, the U.K. investment industry was primarily self-regulated,
with little governmental interference. This scheme of regulation was
turned upside-down in the mid-1980s with extensive deregulation, re-
ferred to as the "Big Bang."' In addition to the Big Bang, the Financial
Services Act of 1986 ("FSA") created a new set of rules that replaced the
prior system.2 These new rules emphasized a move away from complete
self-regulation, yet the drafters made a conscious effort to avoid agency
regulation modeled after the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC").3
Further changes in the U.K. securities industry were, and continue to
be, implemented by the EC Directives concerning the securities and
banking industries.4 These Directives are aimed at creating a single mar-
1. See 10 International Capital Markets and Securities Regulation § 6A.01 (H. Bloo-
menthal rev. ed. 1990) [hereinafter H. Bloomenthal]; N. Poser, International Securities
Regulation: London's "Big Bang" and the European Securities Markets xv (1991).
2. See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 81-82.
3. See H. Bloomenthal, supra note 1, § 6A.01. The language used to describe these
events can be somewhat confusing. As one commentator has stated, "the much heralded
'deregulation' of the London market... involved as much regulation as deregulation."
Peters, Overview of International Securities Regulation, 6 Int'l Tax & Bus. Law. 229, 239
(1988).
The Big Bang was a "deregulation," in the sense that it removed the scattered rules and
barriers to investment activity. The FSA "re-regulation" was an attempt to use one stat-
ute to cover the area of market governance. The U.K chose to continue the tradition of
"self-regulation" under the FSA, but with more government participation than existed
prior to the Big Bang. For a discussion of the misleading use of the word "deregulation,"
see Address by R.B. Jack, A Review of the Legal Problems, reprinted in Financial Dereg-
ulation 51 (R. Dale ed. 1986).
The type of deregulation that has occurred in the U.K., and other markets, has been
referred to by some as "access deregulation." See Warren, Global Harmonization of Se-
curities Laws: The Achievements of the European Communities, 31 Harv. Int'l LJ. 185,
187 (1990). This deregulation involves the lessening of regulatory barriers such as ex-
change controls with an eye towards increasing the international activity of the particular
market. See id. The Big Bang is referred to in the context of access deregulation. See id.
The kind of re-regulation under the FSA has been termed "prudential re-regulation,"
which refers to the kind of "legislative activity undertaken to address the perceived short-
comings of regulatory systems in the aftermath of deregulation." Id. at 188. This form
of re-regulation creates a system of regulation under which internationally accessible
markets may grow while investors are adequately protected. See id. at 188-89.
4. This Note covers banking issues in a very limited context. For more information
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ket in securities across the EC Some of the earlier directives have al-
ready been incorporated into U.K. law and the conduct-of-business rules
governing trading within the U.K. securities markets.6 Other directives
are still under consideration by the EC.7
Finally, the adoption of a real-time automated stock quotation system
is of major concern for both the U.K. securities industry and the various
EC securities markets. The adoption of such a system is a practical ne-
cessity toward the achievement of the EC single market. Toward this
end, the U.K. would like to see its Stock Exchange Automated Quota-
tions ("SEAQ") system simply extended to all EC exchanges.8 There is
some disagreement among EC members, however, as to what system
should eventually be implemented.
This Note examines both the changes in the U.K. securities industry
and related EC issues. Part I discusses the internal deregulation and re-
regulation of the U.K. securities industry in the 1980s resulting from the
Big Bang and the FSA. Part II examines the present and proposed EC
Directives that, as an external force, have created change in the U.K.
securities industry, and the EC as a whole. Part III then explores the
problems encountered by the EC in implementing a community-wide
computerized quotations system, as well as the U.K. interest in ex-
panding SEAQ across the EC. This Note concludes that despite what
may be well-founded British skepticism of the EC goals, the expected
changes will likely strengthen the U.K.'s role in the international securi-
ties markets and promote economic growth across the EC.
I: THE BIG BANG AND THE FINANCIAL SERVICES ACT OF 1986
The year 1986 was one of great change for the British capital markets
and for British securities regulation.9 Two separate events-the Big
Bang and the adoption of the FSA--occurred at that time, changing the
system of securities regulation and the conduct of business within the
U.K.'0
The Big Bang grew out of fears that the U.K. stock exchanges were
too restrictive in comparison to the exchanges of other countries. The
FSA arose in response to the continuing abuses resulting from the form
of self-regulation existing in the industry at that time. The consequence
on EC banking, see Note, Banking on Europe: 1992 and EMU, in Annual Survey of
Institutions and Regulations, Transnational Financial Services in the 1990s, 60 Fordham
L. Rev. S395 (1992).
5. See S.J. Berwin & Co., Company Law and Competition 3 (1989) [hereinafter
Company Law]. The single market will help European companies expand within the EC,
allow American and Japanese companies to aid in European development, and give the
EC as a whole greater international bargaining power. See Warren, supra note 3, at 196.
6. See infra notes 118-62 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 163-249 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 250-74 and accompanying text.
9. See H. Bloomenthal, supra note 1, § 6A.01.
10. See id.
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of these changes was a market more attractive to foreign investors be-
cause it was both more accessible and provided greater investor
protection.
A. The Big Bang
In 1986, the British government prodded the former London Stock
Exchange ("Exchange"), today called the International Stock Exchange
("ISE"), to enact major reforms which have been called, collectively, the
Big Bang.1" Reforms included the elimination of fixed commission
rates, 2 which led to another more significant reform-the elimination of
the "single capacity system" of the Exchange.13 The single capacity sys-
tem had prevented brokers from simultaneously trading stock issues and
"market making," the process of determining stock prices. 4
At this time the U.K. also switched from limited floor trading to
SEAQ-an automated and computerized system of quotations patterned
after the United States NASDAQ system. This switch to SEAQ, coupled
with the elimination of the single capacity system, created a market with
much more liquidity." Some have compared these changes to similar
events in the United States, such as the 1975 unfixing of commission
rates, called "Mayday," and the introduction of NASDAQ. 6
These British reforms arose after a lawsuit, brought against the Ex-
change following a six-year investigation by the Office of Fair Trading
into the practices of the Exchange, concluded that the restrictive nature
of the Exchange dealings violated the Restrictive Practices Act 1976.17
The action was settled when the Exchange promised the British Govern-
ment to reform itself."8 Some U.K. authorities involved in the lawsuit,
11. See Peters, The Changing Structure of the Financial Services Industry and the
Implications for International Securities Regulation, 46 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 525, 530
(1989). The words "Big Bang" are indeed appropriate to describe the reforms and
changes in the U.K. markets. See Address by Philip Wilkinson, Preparing for the Big
Bang, reprinted in Financial Deregulation 22 (R. Dale ed. 1986).
12. See Peters, supra note 11, at 530. For a discussion on how commission rates were
fixed, why they were fixed, and the complexities leading to the need for reform, see N.
Poser, supra note 1, at 13.
13. See Peters, supra note 11, at 530. The prohibition of fixed commission rates made
the single-capacity system untenable. See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 37. See generally id.
(discussing the seven part "link argument" put forth by the Exchange which details why
single-capacity could not survive the unfixing of commission rates).
14. See H. Bloomenthal, supra note 1, § 6A.01.
15. See id.; see also Miller, Regulating Financial Services in the United Kingdom-An
American Perspective, 44 Bus. Law. 323, 326 (1989) (SEAQ is a major advancement be-
cause brokers can now access stock prices at will, as opposed to making many individual
requests to a market maker).
16. See Miller, supra note 15, at 325; see also N. Poser, supra note 1, at 14-17 (discuss-
ing U.S. "Mayday" reforms).
17. See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 25-26.
18. See Miller, supra note 15, at 325; Wilkinson, supra note 11, at 22. See generally




however, were unhappy with the settlement. They believed that if the
suit had gone to completion it "would have brought out all the various
public interest issues, the advantages of competition, the needs of inves-
tor protection, [and] the imperatives of international competitiveness
,19
While the Office of Fair Trading lawsuit prompted reforms, fear was
the real driving force behind the more extreme changes. The U.K. was
particularly concerned that other exchanges around the world would
eventually trade more U.K. stock issues and other foreign issues than the
U.K. exchanges themselves.20 If that were to occur, London would lose
its role as an international securities leader.
As foreign markets incorporated technological advancements and
made other efforts to become attractive to foreign investors, domestic
markets in general had to act to become more competitive.2 Further-
more, the global "trend towards financial deregulation and greater com-
petitive freedom has prompted governments and supervisory authorities
to review their arrangements for regulating the financial services indus-
try."22 The U.K. system especially needed to revitalize because, as one
commentator noted, "[t]he London Stock Exchange was becoming like a
last outpost in a faraway colonial possession."23 Thus, the changes were
a means to increase the U.K.'s role in global securities markets2 4 and to
19. Jack, supra note 3, at 50 (quoting the Director General of Fair Trading).
20. There was little choice but to reform. The London Stock Exchange had trouble
competing on an international level, and also lost business trading domestic U.K. shares.
See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 29; see also id. at 17 ("internationalization of the markets
(i.e., increased competition among the markets of the world, at least in securities of inter-
national interest)" was the underlying cause of British market reform); Address by An-
drew Buxton, Financial Deregulation: The Opportunities and Some of the Dangers,
reprinted in Financial Deregulation 15 (R. Dale ed. 1986) (deregulation of the Exchange
would have occurred despite the Office of Fair Trading lawsuit because of foreign compe-
tition taking U.K. business).
21. See Peters, supra note 11, at 528. Globalization of securities markets has made
offshore exchanges more accessible, and markets have been "streamlining themselves" to
remain competitive. Id. See also Peters & Feldman, The Changing Structure of the Secur-
ities Markets and the Securities Industry: Implications for International Securities Regu-
lation, 9 Mich. Y.B. Int'l Legal Stud. 19, 25 (1988) (the U.K. reforms enacted, so as to
allow its domestic market to remain competitive, are the most "dramatic" to date); Ad-
dress by Richard Dale, Introduction, reprinted in Financial Deregulation xi (R. Dale ed.
1986) ("[tlhis review [of existing financial regulation] has been most far reaching in the
UK").
22. Dale, supra note 21, at xi.
23. Miller, supra note 15, at 325 (quoting I. Kerr, Big Bang 10 (1986)); see also N.
Poser, supra note 1, at 19 (single capacity had been in use since 1847).
24. See Miller, supra note 15, at 326. One commentator suggests that as a result of
technology, market liberalization, and greater investor sophistication, there is a move-
ment toward one global securities market comprised of the New York, Tokyo, and
London exchanges. See Wilkinson, supra note 11, at 23. Another commentator has
stated, "[d]evelopments in communications technology and the general mobility of capi-
tal and persons have all irresistibly contributed to a highly interdependent world econ-
omy, with truly international markets." Rider, Policing the International Financial
Markets: An English Perspective, 16 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 179, 180 (1990). For a discus-
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maintain London's position as a leading international financial center.'
B. The Financial Services Act
Prior to Big Bang, there was a statutory system of securities regulation
in the U.K., but it was not faithfully enforced and did not cover all areas
of the industry. 6 In fact, the U.K. investment industry was heavily self-
regulated; the Exchange itself handled oversight of the investment indus-
try.27 The FSA, enacted shortly after the Big Bang, replaced the prior
system of regulation,2" and as such was a major vehicle for U.K. securi-
ties regulation reform.
The FSA attempted to encapsulate the various provisions of British
securities law under a single act.29 Thus, the FSA encompasses much of
the substance of the prior law governing the securities market, such as is
found in the Companies Act and Prevention of Frauds (Investment) Act.
In addition, the FSA contains new provisions for civil liability that were
not contained in any prior statute.3°
Although the FSA provided for continued self-regulation of the indus-
try, it included provisions for stronger government guidance than in the
pre-Big Bang era.3" FSA regulation thus represents a middle-ground be-
sion evidencing the globalization of securities markets, particularly in regard to the link-
ages of the ISE to investment mechanisms in the United States, see Becker, Global
Securities Markets, 6 Int'l Tax & Bus. Law. 242, 247, 249, 255 (1988).
25. See Miller, supra note 15, at 329. It should be noted that, while the Big Bang was
intended to enliven the U.K. securities markets, "[i]ts primary importance to the rest of
the world was its effect on the international securities markets, not the domestic British
market." N. Poser, supra note 1, at 27.
26. See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 82.
27. See generally id at 84 (discussing pre-FSA self-regulation by the London Stock
Exchange).
28. Forbes-Cockell, Financial Services Regulation in the United Kingdom, Prac. L
Inst., Mar. 15, 1990, available in WESTLAW, International Library, Text & Periodicals
File, at *1. The origin of the FSA is in the "White Paper," which is patterned after
reports written by L.C.B. Gower. See id Gower was an expert on British corporate law,
and was hired by the Department of Trade and Industry to advise on new securities
legislation. See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 85.
29. See H. Bloomenthal, supra note 1, § 6A.02; see also Forbes-Cockell, supra note
28, at *1 (notably, the Gower report, as one of the bases of the FSA, called for a single
statute encompassing securities regulation laws).
30. See H. Bloomenthal, supra note 1, at § 6A.02; see also Halloran & Scudellari,
Securities Offerings Abroad by Domestic Issuers, Both Public and Private, 6 Int'l Tax &
Bus. Law. 262, 292 (1988) (the Companies Act of 1985 was a major source of regulation
over the U.K. securities industry prior to the FSA); Miller, supra note 15, at 331 (the
Prevention of Frauds (Investment) Act, which was replaced by the FSA, "was the pri-
mary legislation affecting the investment industry in the U.K."); Rider, supra note 24, at
189 ("Prior to the FSA. . . there were certain statutory provisions regulating the invest-
ment industry ... under the Companies Act and the Prevention of Fraud (Investments)
Act 1958."). For discussion of FSA imposition of civil liability, see infra notes 80-96 and
accompanying text. For a limited discussion of the relationship of the FSA to prior U.K.
laws governing the securities industry, see Note, International Financial Markets and
Regulation of Trading of International Equities, 19 Cal. W. Int'l LJ. 327, 351-53 (1989).
31. See H. Bloomenthal, supra note 1, § 6A.02; Forbes-Cockell, supra note 28, at *1.
The Gower report notably recommended a continuation of the prior self-regulatory na-
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tween full agency regulation and earlier complete self-regulation.32
The easing of certain restrictions under the Big Bang had reduced con-
fidence in the self-regulating structure, and the need for change became
evident.33 The U.K. had "long prided itself on a system of securities
regulation with a minimal statutory basis," but "given the nature of the
changes taking place at the Exchange (particularly the conflicts of inter-
est inherent in integrating market making and [trading] of securities), it
[was] inevitable that a more formal regulatory structure be adopted."34
Furthermore, sizeable pre-FSA scandals involving Lloyd's of London
dramatically illustrated the problems linked to self-regulation.35 These
scandals involved the misappropriation of vast amounts of money by
Lloyd's of London professionals.3 6
Today, while there is still self-regulation, it operates under the statu-
tory framework of the FSA, which is intended to curb abuses and rebuild
public confidence in the financial services industry by providing more
governmental oversight.3 7 In this regard, the FSA, in conjunction with
Big Bang reforms, has kept the U.K. market competitive on a global
scale while also serving to protect the interests of the individual
investor.38
ture of the securities industry. See id. at * 1. Referring to the content of the Gower
report, "[t]he statutory framework would be based so far as possible on self-regulation,
but the self-regulation would be subject to governmental supervision." N. Poser, supra
note 1, at 86. This increased governmental oversight under the FSA has been felt espe-
cially by securities firms. See Riley, London May Face Challenge, Fin. Times, Nov. 17,
1988, Survey sec., at XII, cols. 1, 3-4.
32. "What the Government is attempting to do in the Financial Services [Act] is...
to encourage self-regulation within a statutory framework." Jack, supra note 3, at 51.
33. See H. Bloomenthal, supra note 1, § 6A.01. Changes in the U.K. securities indus-
try after Word War II rendered the traditional self-regulatory system ineffective to guard
"against the incompetent, let alone fraudulent." Rider, supra note 24, at 184.
34. H. Bloomenthal, supra note 1, at § 6A.01.
35. See Miller, supra note 15, at 330 & n.35. A call for new regulation occurred after
other instances of fraud by investment firms upon their customers, involving the misap-
propriation of funds. See id. at 330. It became obvious that the existing self-regulatory
structure could not cope with the problem of fraud. See Rider, supra note 24, at 189.
36. See Nader Accuses Lloyd's of London of Destabilizing American Market, 55 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1374, at 58 (July 14, 1988); Moore, Howden Makes
£13.4m Offer to Lloyd's Members, Fin. Times, Dec. 18, 1985, § 1, at 8, cols. 1, 1-2. The
problems at Lloyd's of London have continued. Between 1983 and 1986 seventeen disci-
plinary cases were completed by Lloyd's internal disciplinary committees. See Lloyd's of
London Report May Calm Regulatory Fears, Reuters, Jan. 21, 1987, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Omni File, at *1.
37. See Miller, supra note 15, at 360; see also Halloran & Scudellari, supra note 30, at
292 (noting that the FSA was "an attempt to restore investor confidence in the U.K.
securities market," which had deteriorated as a result of the scandals under the prior self-
regulatory system); Rider, supra note 24, at 185 (noting DTI view that the primary pur-
pose of the FSA is to increase investor confidence).
38. See H. Bloomenthal, supra note 1, § 6A.01 n.6.
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C. Regulatory Structure of the U.K. Securities Market under the
FSA39
The FSA requires one to be "authorized" in order to engage in invest-
ment business in the U.K., unless a statutory exemption applies.' Any
unauthorized person or firm conducting securities or investment business
may be criminally prosecuted.4
This "authorization" can be obtained in several ways under the FSA.
The Securities and Investment Board ("SIB") can directly authorize the
person. Membership in an SIB-recognized Self-Regulating Organization
("SRO") or Recognized Professional Body ("RPB") are alternate routes
for authorization.42 The SIB also acknowledges Recognized Investment
Exchanges ("RIEs"), although membership in an RIE is insufficient in
and of itself to entitle someone to legally engage in investment business.43
1. The Securities and Investment Board
The FSA gave power of investment and securities regulation to the
Secretary of State of the Department of Trade and Industry ("DTI"),
and allowed the Secretary to delegate that power to a private sector
"Designated Agency," which is the SIB." The SIB is comprised of vari-
ous staff members and a chairperson, all of whom are appointed jointly
by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and the Governor of the
Bank of England. Despite these appointments, the SIB is considered a
private agency.45
The objectives of the SIB are two-fold. It is designed to head "a sys-
tem of effective investor protection across the UK markets and, at the
same time, to ensure that those markets develop efficiently and competi-
tively."" Towards the achievement of these objectives, the SIB has fairly
39. The FSA is a very complicated document. It covers everything from public
offierings to collective investment schemes (mutual funds). See Poser, supra note 1, at 91.
The focus of this part of the Note will be limited to the regulatory framework devised
under the FSA. While only part of the mass of information in the FSA, it is within this
framework and structure that the rulemaking bodies under the FSA create most of the
regulations governing the U.K. securities industry.
40. See Financial Services Act, 1986, § 3 (Eng.); Forbes-Cockell, supra note 28, at * 1.
See generally Miller, supra note 15, at 334 (discussing people and activities excluded from
FSA coverage). For a list of entities exempted from FSA coverage, see Financial Services
Act, 1986, §§ 35-45 (Eng.).
41. See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 91; Financial Services Act, 1986, § 4 (Eng.).
42. See Financial Services Act, 1986, §§ 25, 7, & 15 (Eng.); H. Bloomenthal, supra
note 1, § 6A.02.
43. See H. Bloomenthal, supra note 1, § 6A.02. Once an RIE is recognized by the
SIB it is actually exempted from authorization. See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 103.
Nonetheless, it must meet certain conditions in order to conduct investment business. Id.
44. See Financial Services Act, 1986, § 114 (Eng.); Miller, supra note 15, at 335. For
FSA requirements imposed on the Designated Agency/SIB, see Financial Services Act,
1986, §§ 114-18 & sched. 7 (Eng.).
45. See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 92-93.
46. Address by Sir Kenneth Berrill, The Securities and Investment Board: Its Objec-
tives and Expectations, reprinted in Financial Deregulation 18 (R. Dale ed. 1986).
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broad powers, including the ability to criminally prosecute those who
engage in investment business without proper authorization.47 The SIB
may also directly authorize an individual to engage in investment activi-
ties and can regulate those activities, as well as authorize the existence of
SROs and RPBs. It also has power to approve the rulebooks of the self-
regulating bodies, and to seek compliance orders against them.48 While
the SIB has the power to directly authorize individuals and firms to en-
gage in securities transactions, it has expressed the desire that most seek
authorization under an SRO.49
The SIB rules, known as the "SIB rulebook," initially served as a
model for the rules promulgated by an SRO or RPB.5 The DTI, how-
ever, must be satisfied that the SIB rules themselves provide an adequate
level of investor protection and comport with objectives of the FSA.51 If
the DTI is not satisfied that the SIB is operating satisfactorily, or finds
that its rules are inadequate or overly anti-competitive, it may reclaim
SIB rule-making functions.52 The DTI's ability to revoke the SIB's
power is an instance of potential governmental intervention in this pri-
marily self-regulated industry.5 3
2. Self-Regulating Organizations
As the FSA intended, SROs assume the majority of the self-regulation
in the U.K. investment industry. Once the SIB recognizes an SRO, that
SRO has regulatory power over its members. 4 The requirements for
SRO recognition by the SIB are as follows: its rules must provide ade-
47. See Berrill, supra note 46, at 20. This is "a particularly unusual function for a
private [sector organization]." Id. However, this makes perfect sense in the case of the
SIB because it does operate and oversee the authorization process. See id.
48. See Miller, supra note 15, at 335; H. Bloomenthal, supra note 1, § 6A.02; see also
Financial Services Act, 1986, §§ 25-28 (Eng.) (SIB direct authorization); §§ 9-10 (Eng.)
(SIB authorization of SROs); §§ 17-18 (Eng.) (SIB authorization of RPBs); §§ 10(3),
18(3) (Eng.) (SIB approval of rulebooks); §§ 12, 20 (Eng.) (compliance orders); see gener-
ally Forbes-Cockell, supra note 28, at *4 (the SIB has three tasks: recognizing SROs and
RPBs, drawing up its own rulebook, and overseeing the regulatory system).
49. See Miller, supra note 15, at 337. In theory a person or firm can choose to be
authorized by the SIB or an SRO, but "[t]he SIB has discouraged direct [SIB] authoriza-
tion." N. Poser, supra note 1, at 93.
50. See H. Bloomenthal, supra note 1, § 6A.03. For discussion concerning the de-
tailed SIB rulebook, see Forbes-Cockell, supra note 28, at *4. Note that "equivalency"
essentially called for SRO and RPB rulebooks to be almost identical to the SIB rulebook.
See id.; see also infra notes 80-96 and accompanying text (discussing the problem of dam-
ages for breach of such rules, and subsequent amendment of the FSA to do away with
"equivalency").
51. See Financial Services Act, 1986, § 114(9) (Eng.); H. Bloomenthal, supra note 1,
§ 6A.02 n.1.
52. See Financial Services Act, 1986, § 115 (Eng.); H. Bloomenthal, supra note 1,
§ 6A.02 n.1.
53. "Even though the Secretary of State [through the DTI] has delegated most of
these regulatory powers to the Designated Agency [the SIB], this Agency is under the
control of the DTI." Miller, supra note 15, at 336.
54. See id. at 337.
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quate investor protection; it must see to enforcement of its rules; its gov-
ernance must be representative of the public; it must be able to
investigate complaints; it must be able to advance fairness and integrity;
and it must be willing to provide information to the SIB and the DTI.'-
The general functions of an SRO are to decide whether members are
"fit and proper" to engage in the specific investment business covered by
the SRO, to devise adequate means to enforce the rules relating to the
investment business of its members, and to create fair procedures regard-
ing admission and punishment of members.5
6
The SROs, among themselves, differ widely in character and each
SRO usually covers a distinct area of the investment business. For exam-
ple, one SRO regulates those who deal with private investors, while an-
other covers those who engage in the marketing of securities. This
division of authority creates regulatory separation among the various ar-
eas of the investment industry."
Initially, each SRO was required to have rules that afforded a level of
protection to investors equivalent to the protection provided pursuant to
the SIB rules.58 Amendments to the FSA, however, eventually abolished
the equivalency requirement in favor of broader SIB guidelines that em-
phasized investor protection. 9 The SIB, however, still maintains power
to review the particular rules of an SRO.' Moreover, the SIB must be
satisfied with the rules, and can still impose individual mandatory
rules.61
3. Recognized Professional Bodies
A person who is a member of an RPB that is recognized by the SIB is
authorized to conduct securities and investment business in the U.K.6'
An RPB operates similarly to an SRO, and as such is subject to SIB and
DTI guidelines and oversight in order to protect investors.63
Unlike an SRO, an RPB's members are professional people, such as
accountants and solicitors, who wish to carry out investment business
55. See Financial Services Act, 1986, sched. 2 (Eng.); N. Poser, supra note 1, at 94.
56. See Miller, supra note 15, at 337-38.
57. See id. at 338; H. Bloomenthal, supra note 1, § 6A.03; see also Miller, supra note
15, at 339-41 (overview of present SROs and specific functions they cover); N. Poser,
supra note 1, at 94-95 (same).
58. See H. Bloomenthal, supra note 1, § 6A.03.
59. See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text for more on the problem of
equivalency and why it led to amendment of the FSA.
60. See Financial Services Act, 1986, § 13 (Eng.).
61. See id.; Forbes-Cockell, supra note 28, at *6; infra note 95 and accompanying
text.
62. See H. Bloomenthal, supra note 1, § 6A.03.
63. See Miller, supra note 15, at 342. See generally Berrill, supra note 46, at 20 (dis-
cussing the early concerns of RPBs about having to adjust their rules according to the




"incidental" to their particular profession." Thus, RPB members are
not primarily concerned with the investment business. There is then the
risk that their rulebooks, supervisory systems, and disciplinary proce-
dures regarding investment ventures may be inadequate. 65  Conse-
quently, the rules of the RPB must explicitly restrict members to
investment activities "incidental" to their profession. 66
D. Criticisms of the Big Bang and the FSA
1. Big Bang
It has been several years since the reforms of the Big Bang. Although
the Big Bang has given the U.K. the lead in the Euromarkets, the re-
forms have occasiohally been criticized. For instance, some critics be-
lieve that the former single-capacity system actually enhanced investor
protection by keeping brokers and market-makers (price-setters) sepa-
rate, thus reducing the risk of conflicts of interest inherent when those
who sell shares also determine the price of those shares.67 While a dual-
capacity system is not required today, the lifting of its prohibition cou-
pled with the unfixing of commission rates (two Big Bang reforms) made
single capacity unprofitable6" and impossible. 69 Thus, the increased risk
due to potential conflicts of interest must be weighed against theoretical
benefits of increased competition from the unfixing of commission rates.
In addition, some critics have noted that the "touch"-the difference
between the selling and buying prices of stock-has increased since the
Big Bang to the detriment of the small investor. Some view this increase
primarily as a result of SEAQ, whose quote-driven market-making fos-
ters this price differential.70 Large institutional investors, however, can
avoid the touch by shopping around, off SEAQ, for a better price.7 Un-
like their institutional counterparts, small investors do not have this op-
portunity and must use SEAQ.72
A criticism related to the widening of the touch is that commission
rates for small deals have actually risen. Thus, the supposed increased
competition among brokers after the unfixing of commission rates has
64. See Miller, supra note 15, at 342.
65. See Berrill, supra note 46, at 20.
66. See Miller, supra note 15, at 342.
67. See Five Years Since Big Bang-After the Earthquake, Economist, Oct. 26, 1991,
at 23, 23 [hereinafter Five Years]. "[T]he end of the single-capacity system has created
new conflicts of interest that may reduce investors' confidence in the integrity of the
markets." N. Poser, supra note 1, at 75.
68. See Five Years, supra note 67, at 23.
69. For a discussion on the impossibility of maintaining the single capacity system
once rates were unfixed, see supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
70. See Five Years, supra note 67, at 24. See also N. Poser, supra note 1, at 48-50 (the
"transparency" of SEAQ causes this problem).
71. See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 50. Institutional investors could "save money by
dealing directly with one another between the published" stock quotes. Id.
72. See Five Years, supra note 67, at 24.
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not created a benefit for the small trader.73 Furthermore, higher com-
mission rates and the wider SEAQ touch have resulted in a decrease in
the volume of trading.74
Finally, since the Big Bang, critics argue that the securities market has
been concentrated in larger firms." This has supposedly occurred be-
cause many firms entered the U.K. hoping to reap the benefits of Big
Bang deregulation and the anticipated increased trading. 6 When lower
commission rates for institutional trades and lost revenues were com-
pounded by a sharp decline in trading following the 1987 market crash,
firms began to abandon the London securities market." As a result, only
"very large firms and specialty firms" have survived in this atmosphere.78
The risk today is that the remaining firms will "flex[] their competitive
muscles" and drive smaller entities out of business, collapsing the market
further into an already tight circle of conglomerates.79
2. The FSA
Criticisms of the FSA are more substantial than those lodged at the
Big Bang, and have actually led to an amendment of the statute. Much
criticism has been levelled against the imposition of civil liability under
Section 62 of the FSA, in conjunction with the "equivalency standard"
for SRO and RPB rulebooks80
Section 62 of the FSA allowed for the imposition of damages for losses
73. See id at 24. Small sized trades of shares were not any cheaper after the Big
Bang. See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 54-55.
74. See Five Years, supra note 67, at 24. Of 2,100 shares listed in June 1991, 1,300
were not traded at all during the month. See id. But see id. at 26 (SEAQ has generally
worked well, albeit at times at the expense of the small investor, and SEAQ International
has been dominating cross-border trading).
75. See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 74. For an early prediction of the present concen-
trated state of the U.K. investment industry, drawn from the U.S. experience following
the 1975 "Mayday" reforms, see Wilkinson, supra note 11, at 25.
76. See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 72. See also Buxton, supra note 20, at 15 (large
banks availed themselves of the deregulated U.K. securities market, so as to increase their
services provision business).
77. See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 72. This was especially true of foreign firms operat-
ing in London. See id. at 72-73. See also Buxton, supra note 20, at 16 (discussing early
concerns that banks providing investment services were entering the U.K. market at the
height of competition, which was dangerous because market returns might not justify the
risk of such moves); Wilkinson, supra note 11, at 27 (expressing early belief that institu-
tions entering the post-Big Bang market were exposing themselves to risks from an ex-
tremely competitive market).
78. N. Poser, supra note 1, at 72. "There will ... be a place for the specialist, since
experience.., shows that there is always a market for skill and specialisation." Buxton,
supra note 20, at 16. Large firms are able to function because they are capitalized at a
greater level and can compete in the global securities market. See Panel Discussion, re-
printed in Financial Deregulation 81 (R. Dale ed. 1986). See generally N. Poser, supra
note 1, at 74 (for discussion of the firms that dominate the U.K. securities industry).
79. N. Poser, supra note 1, at 74.
80. See Forbes-Cockell, supra note 28, at *4. For discussion and meaning of
"equivalency," see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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stemming from violation of an SRO's rules."1 The equivalency standard
necessitated an almost line-by-line adoption of the SIB rulebook by SROs
and RPBs,12 but the complicated SIB provisions led to small differences
in SRO/RPB equivalent adaptation." This, in turn, led to "entirely dif-
ferent answers ... to quite simple questions."'"
SROs were thus concerned that the rules they were drafting were leav-
ing uncertainty about their legal duties under Section 62. Therefore,
overly detailed rules emerged that were legalistic and obscure.8" Eventu-
ally the SIB realized that SROs needed a simpler and more flexible ap-
proach to rulemaking.86 This simplified approach is contained in what is
known as the "1989 Proposal," devised and eventually adopted by the
SIB.8 7 The Companies Act of 1989, which amended the FSA, enacted
the new system into law.88
The SIB can now promulgate necessary "principles" to be incorpo-
rated by SROs into their own rulebooks8 9 An SRO can then adapt these
principles with some flexibility, as opposed to complying with the previ-
ously extensive list of SIB rules.' The SIB can still review the SRO/
RPB rules to ensure that the principles it set out have been followed.
Now, however, the SIB evaluates rules under the more subjective stan-
dard of "adequacy of investor protection," as opposed to the prior objec-
tive "equivalence" standard.91
Violation by an SRO of its own rules based on SIB principles may still
lead to common law civil liability under contract or tort principles,92 but
the violation does not of itself lead to an express right to a civil suit by an
investor under the FSA.93 Nevertheless, failure to comply with broad
SIB principles can be grounds for disciplinary action.94
Additionally, the SIB can stili impose mandatory rules under the 1989
81. See Forbes-Cockell, supra note 28, at *4; see generally Rider, supra note 24, at
194-200 (discussing the benefits of civil enforcement of U.K. securities law). It is worth-
while to note that the EC has dealt with this area under a proposed Directive, making the
supplier of a service liable for damages for the faulty provision of that service. See Harris,
Damaging Advice and Services-EC Proposals, 135 Solic. J. 318, 318-19 (1991).
82. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
83. See Forbes-Cockell, supra note 28, at *4.
84. Id. at *4.
85. See id. at *4.
86. See id. at *5.
87. See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 127.
88. See Forbes-Cockell, supra note 28, at *5.
89. See id. at *5. The "principles" represent broad standards of conduct that all
SROs and RPBs must follow. See id. The 1989 Proposal advanced this "general" ap-
proach, with the SIB's broad principles as a guide under which SROs were to make their
rules. See generally N. Poser, supra note 1, at 127-29 (for discussion of these principles,
known as the "10 Commandments").
90. See Forbes-Cockell, supra note 28, at *6.
91. See id.
92. See id. at *5; N. Poser, supra note 1, at 132.
93. See Forbes-Cockell, supra note 28, at *5; N. Poser, supra note 1, at 132.
94. See N. Poser, supra note I, at 132.
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Proposal, but these may simply be followed by an SRO without any need
for incorporation into a rulebook. This should eliminate inherent differ-
ences and problems in creating "substantially equivalent" precepts based
on these rules.95 SRO violation of such SIB-designated rules would be
grounds for a civil action by an investor under Section 62.96
In addition to the equivalency standard criticism, the FSA also poses
problems in that it requires firms with a range of investment activities to
become members of several SROs, because each SRO is limited to au-
thorize only certain investment activities.97 Larger firms are concerned
about the awkwardness and expense of these multiple, overlapping SRO
registrations.98 Further, such multiple SRO coverage is likely to lead to
gaps in regulation and to confuse people and firms trying to meet varying
standards of investor protection.99
Furthermore, since SRO members cannot be authorized to engage in
activities outside the scope of the particular SRO's authority, there will
be undue delays in authorization if a new investment activity arises. In-
vestors will have to wait until a new SRO is formed for purposes of au-
thorization or until an existing one is expanded."°
There are two additional criticisms of the FSA. First, the FSA has
weak enforcement provisions. It allows for the SIB to prosecute viola-
tors, but in the late 1980s there were only several SIB junior investiga-
tors. 10 1 While the SIB has improved somewhat in this area, the low
priority on enforcement is still evidenced by the SIB's reliance upon
outside investigators and the inexperience of its own personnel.1' 2 Sec-
ond, the whole FSA system of self-regulation is suspect because of the
problems demonstrated by the only other example of self-regulation-
Lloyd's of London insurance. 0 3 Further, the post-FSA scandal involv-
ing Guinness casts doubt on the success of continued self-regulation1t 4
Guinness, while in competition with another company to acquire Distill-
95. See id See generally Forbes-Cockell, supra note 28, at $7 (discussing these
"core" or "designated" SIB rules); N. Poser, supra note 1, at 129-30 (same). The rules
left to be formulated by the SROs are referred to as "sub-rules." See Forbes, supra note
28, at *7. Note that these SIB core rules are an instance of increased interference in the
self-regulatory structure of the U.K. investment business.
96. See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 129-30.
97. See Miller, supra note 15, at 361. The origin of this SRO limitation is in the
Gower report, which called for self-regulation along "functional... lines," with each
SRO "responsible for a different part of the investment business." N. Poser, supra note 1,
at 86.
98. See Miller, supra note 15, at 362.
99. See id. at 361. Miller refers to this problem as "gaps and overlaps." Id.
100. See id. at 363.
101. See id at 362 & n.218.
102. See Rider, supra note 24, at 191.
103. See Miller, supra note 15, at 363. The author is skeptical of the FSA scheme of
regulation, stating that "in the long run it [regulation by a government body] may be
viewed as more desirable." Id. at 361. For a discussion of the Lloyd's of London scan-
dals, see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
104. See Miller, supra note 15, at 331.
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ers Co., drove up the price of its shares. It did so because Guinness
shares were included in its offer to shareholders of Distillers Co., and a
higher market price for Guinness stock would make the offer more
attractive. 105
II: EUROPEAN COMMUNITY DIRECTIVES CREATING CHANGE IN
THE INVESTMENT INDUSTRY AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE
U.K. SYSTEM
The EC has enacted many Directives" that have affected the EC in-
vestment industry, all intended to aid movement towards the "single
market"' 7 envisioned by the 1957 Treaty of Rome.' Furthermore, the
Directives aid in the ability of a Member State, as well as other foreign
issuers, to offer securities across the entire EC.10 9 The Directives have
had a major impact upon U.K. securities regulation because, as a mem-
ber of the EC, the U.K. is obligated to incorporate the substance of a
Directive into domestic law.110 While a Member State must meet the
minimum requirements called for by a Directive, there is no prohibition
on that State enacting more stringent securities rules for entities originat-
105. See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 271.
106. See generally Morris, The Direct Effect of Directives-Some Recent Developments
in the European Court-I, 1989 J. Bus. L. 233, 233-34 (1989) (defining a Directive and its
usage by the EC).
107. For a discussion of the EC single market, see supra note 5.
108. See A. Swan & J. Murphy, Cases and Materials on the Regulation of Interna-
tional Business and Economic Relations 286-89 (MB) (1991). The Single European Act,
adopted in 1986, furthered the EC efforts to create the single market by calling for inte-
gration by December 31, 1992. See id. at 287.
The UCITS Directive, Council Directive 85/611, 1985 O.J. (L 375) 3, as amended by
Council Directive 88/220, 1988 O.J. (L 100) 31, relates to the harmonization of national
law and increased investor protection as to "collective investment" schemes (ie. mutual
funds). See Council Directive 85/611, para. 2, 1985 O.J. (L 375) 3, 3. This Note is
concerned with basic issues of stock and, to a lesser extent, with debt securities. As such,
the UCITS Directive is beyond the scope of this discussion. This Directive, however, is
important because "it shows, in microcosm, the nature of the present strategy for com-
pleting the internal market in financial services. In a sense, therefore, it has something of
the character of a pathfinder Directive." Blair, Europe 1992 and the Harmonisation of
Standards for the Regulation of Financial Institutions, 16 Can. Bus. L. J. 97, 103 (1990).
The UCITS Directive "proceeds by three fundamental propositions" that become "the
core of the subsequent Community initiatives." Id. at 104. The three elements are (1) the
requirement of authorization in one State that is valid in all the others, called "home
State authorisation," (2) "host State" control over matters affecting users in that State of
home State authorized services, and (3) "harmonisation and minimum standards." Id. at
104-05.
109. See Halloran & Scudellari, supra note 30, at 299; see generally id. at 292-99 (dis-
cussing the offering of securities in the U.K. under the FSA and the ISE rules).
110. Directives are not directly applicable to Member States. They are binding upon
the States, however, as to the final objective of the Directive. See Steiner, Coming to
Terms with EEC Directives, 106 L. Q. Rev. 144, 145 (1990). Thus, Member States are
obligated "to implement measures to achieve the prescribed results." Id. See generally
id. at 149-59 (examining the approaches taken by the U.K. courts in implementing
Directives).
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ing in that State."
One goal of the EC is "harmonization" of the various member states'
laws, in order to provide equivalent safeguards across the EC.112 The
Directives effect such harmonization, which was originally understood to
mean that the various Member States had leeway in implementing the
goals of a particular Directive." 3 As to general "company law," how-
ever, scholars have argued that the EC Directives effectively result in a
unification of member states' law, leaving only the details to be sorted out
by each Member State." 4 This argument is evidenced by the "far-reach-
ing changes" initiated by the Directives on British company law." 5
Furthermore, there are difficulties in regard to the safeguarding objec-
tives of company-law harmonization in the EC. First, there is the prob-
lem of discerning which provisions of domestic company law are indeed
safeguards, and thus targets for harmonization. Second, and com-
pounding the first problem, is the interdependence among domestic com-
pany-law provisions. Finally, assuming harmonization in this area is
directed at the correct national laws, it will nonetheless be difficult to
determine whether an adequate level of equivalency has been achieved
among domestic laws." 6
The next section explores some of the Directives, past and present,
that affect EC securities law" 7 and the U.K. securities system.
A. Past Directives
Two Directives previously devised by the EC and incorporated into
U.K. domestic law, the Admissions Directive and the Listing Particulars
Directive, illustrate the EC move toward the single market These Direc-
tives also show the effect Directives have had on national law, and illus-
trate the particular concerns of the U.K. in trying to meet Directive
obligations.
111. See Halloran & Scudellari, supra note 30, at 299.
112. See Morris, supra note 106, at 242. Harmonization is also closely related to the
concepts of deregulation and re-regulation of domestic securities markets. See Warren,
supra note 3, at 190. While deregulation makes markets more accessible, and re-regula-
tion allows for both the growth of those markets and increased investor protection, har-
monization reduces the differences between domestic regulatory schemes. See id. This is
viewed as a method of achieving greater protection because regulatory variations could
otherwise lead to abuses. See id
113. See Morris, supra note 106, at 242. See generally Company Law, supra note 5, at
16-22 (discussing harmonization and related principles).
114. See Morris, supra note 106, at 242.
115. Id.
116. See F. Wooldridge, Company Law in the United Kingdom and the European
Community: Its Harmonization and Unification 4 (1991).
117. Directives in the area of securities law show the premium the EC has placed on
the disclosure of information. See Warren, supra note 3, at 209 & n.144.
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1. The Admissions Directive
The Admissions Directive1 8 sets out the minimum conditions a com-
pany and its stock (and issuers of debt securities) must meet in order for
an issue to gain admission to a Member State stock exchange. The con-
tinuing obligations the issuer of the stock (and debt securities) must meet
are also stated in this Directive." 9
The coordination of conditions for admission of securities to Member
State stock exchanges was intended to accomplish several goals. First,
the Directive provided increased protection to the investor by virtue of
EC-wide uniformity in the area. Second, it facilitated admission of secur-
ities across the EC and among EC exchanges. Third, it allowed in-
creased "interpenetration of national securities markets" by Member
States to aid the establishment of the single European market.
20
Under this Directive certain conditions must be met before an issue
will be admitted to the official listing on a Member exchange. In the case
of shares, the conditions extend to both the issuing company and the
shares themselves. In the case of debt securities, the conditions apply to
both those issued by a private undertaking and those issued by a State. ' 2
Furthermore, admission is subject to the issuers of the securities meet-
ing specific obligations.122 Where the obligations require that an issuer
make certain information public, the issuer must publish this information
in newspapers with wide circulation, or publish notice in such newspa-
pers that the information is available in writing at indicated places. 23
Although Member States are required to meet the minimum standards
set out by the Directive, they are free to impose some stricter conditions
and obligations as long as they apply to all parties seeking admission to
listing on an exchange. 124
118. Council Directive 79/279, 1979 O.J. (L 66) 21 [hereinafter Admissions Directive].
119. See Reid & Ballheimer, The Legal Framework of the Securities Industry in the
European Community Under the 1992 Program, 29 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 103, 124-25
(1991); Company Law, supra note 5, at 36.
120. See Admissions Directive, supra note 118, para. 1. This Directive makes note
that "partial coordination of the conditions for admission to official listing constitutes a
first step towards subsequent closer alignment of the rules of Member States in this field."
Id. para. 6.
121. Id. art. 4(1). Article 4(1) of the Directive imposes the conditions, which are listed
in Schedule A of the Admissions Directive for shares, and in Schedule B of the Admis-
sions Directive for debt securities.
122. See id. art. 4(2). Obligations are set out in Schedule C for companies issuing
shares. See id. at 30, sched. C. Schedule D sets out obligations for an undertaking which
issues debt securities. See id. at 31, sched. D(A). Also in Schedule D are the obligations
of a State issuing debt securities. See id. at 32, sched. D(B).
123. See id. art. 17.
124. See id. art. 5(1). Note that Article 5(4) specifically allows Member States to sub-
ject issuers to national rules requiring regular release to the public of financial positions
and course of business. See id. art. 5(4). Note also that the Directive prohibits stricter
requirements. See generally id. art. 6 (prohibition on a Member State conditioning ad-
mission of another Member's securities to its exchange on those securities already having
gained admittance to another EC exchange).
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The drafters of the Admissions Directive placed an obvious premium
on investor protection. The Directive allows a Member State to reject an
application for the admission of a security to an exchange if the State
believes such admission would harm investors." 2 It also allows a State
to impose "special conditions" on the admission of a particular security if
it is in the interest of investor protection. 126 Further, an issuer who has
securities admitted to listing in a State must provide any information to
its authorities that is needed to protect investors.'27 The authorities may
also suspend the listing where investor or market protection so
requires. 128
The Directive also sets up a Contact Committee. The Committee will
facilitate implementation of the Directive, and aid harmonization of both
the minimum standards and the permissible more stringent national
standards.129
2. The Listing Particulars Directive
The Listing Particulars Directive 30 is almost a companion piece of EC
legislation with the Admissions Directive. 3' This Directive sets the min-
imum requirements that must be met for the listing particulars to be pub-
lished when an issuer seeks admission of its shares (or debt securities) to
an EC exchange.' 3 2 Further, it seeks to harmonize these disclosure re-
quirements. 33 Member states are charged with enforcing this Directive,
and no particulars can be published without approval. Moreover, the
approval must be in accord with the Directive mandates."
Listing particulars are a means of investor protection because they
provide objective information about the financial condition of the issuer
and about the security for which admission is sought.' 3 - Prior to the
enactment of the Listing Particulars Directive, however, the existence of
varying sets of such safeguards among different EC Member States cre-
ated problems. First, issuers found it more difficult to obtain listings on
several EC exchanges because each Member State required something
125. See id. art. 9(3).
126. Id. art. 10. Note that this is a derogation from Article 5, which allows extra
conditions only where applicable to all.
127. See id art. 13.
128. See id. art. 14(1).
129. See id. art. 20.
130. Council Directive 80/390, 1980 OJ. (L 100) 1 [hereinafter Listing Directive].
131. As evidence of this, the Admissions Directive allowed Member States to delay its
adoption until they adopted the Listing Particulars Directive. See Admissions Directive,
supra note 118, art. 22; see also Listing Directive, supra note 130, art. 26 (the Contact
Committee set out by the Admissions Directive is also authorized to handle harmoniza-
tion problems that arise from the Listing Particulars Directive).
132. Admission of securities to a member exchange is conditioned on publication of
the listing particulars. See Listing Directive, supra note 130, art. 3.
133. See Company Law, supra note 5, at 36-37.
134. See Listing Directive, supra note 130, art. 18 (1)(2)(3).
135. See id. para. 2.
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different in the particulars. Second, investors were discouraged from
buying securities across the EC because of varying levels of disclosure
requirements. Consequently, the overall financing of EC projects was
inhibited. 3 6 To offset these problems, the goals of this Directive were
two-fold: to achieve adequate equivalence of safeguards by eliminating
different listing requirements among Member States, and to ensure that
sufficient and objective information is released to investors.1 37
In general, the Listing Particulars Directive requires that the set of
particulars contain the information necessary for investors or their advi-
sors to assess the "assets and liabilities, financial position, profits and
losses, and prospects of the issuer and of the rights attaching to such
securities. ' 138 Furthermore, the Directive requires that the particulars
include extensive specific information. Schedules A, B, and C of the Di-
rective, referred to in Article 5(1), 13 1 indicate the specific information
that generally must be included in a listing.
Schedule A sets out the particulars required where the admission of
shares of stock is involved."4 Schedule B sets out the listing particulars
required where debt securities are involved.' 41 Schedule C sets out the
requirements where "certificates representing shares" are sought to be
admitted to listing on an exchange. 142 Where an issuer falls outside the
scope of Schedules A, B, and C, the listing must nevertheless contain
equivalent information.143 The Directive also provides an extensive list
of exemptions under which there may be no obligation to publish listing
particulars. For example, a Member State may exempt publication of
listing particulars for securities which have been issued in connection
with a takeover or a merger, or for shares of stock given at no cost to
prior holders of the same stock. 44
The Directive also provides a considerable roll of "specific cases."
Under each specific case, the precise information to be included in the
listing is set out, often with detailed references to sections of the Sched-
ules.145 Thus, depending on the kind of security involved, there are dif-
fering amounts of required information to be disclosed. Each security
sought to be admitted is not required to have all the information con-
tained in a particular Schedule.
The listing particulars must be published either in a newspaper in the
State where admission to listing is sought, or in a free brochure available
136. See id. para. 3.
137. See id. para. 4.
138. Id. art. 4.
139. See id. art. 5.
140. See id. at 11, sched. A.
141. See id. at 19, sched. B.
142. See id. at 25, sched. C.
143. See id. art. 5(3).
144. See id. art. 6.
145. See id. arts. 8-17.
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at certain mandatory sites. 1" These sites include the stock exchange
where listing was sought, the office of the issuer, and the offices of the
issuer's agent in the Member State where admission was sought. 147 Fur-
ther, either the whole of the particulars, or a notice stating where it has
been published by the issuer (or where it can be obtained) must be set out
in a publication designated by the Member State itself. 48 In addition,
any new and relevant information must be set out in a supplement to
those particulars already published.149
Where various States and their exchanges receive admission applica-
tions, the States are to use "best efforts" to coordinate listing particular
requirements and to agree on a single set of particulars.' 5" To this ex-
tent, where securities have been listed in another Member State within
the previous six months, the State to whom application is made shall
exempt the issuer from preparing another prospectus." 1
3. The Past Effect of the Admissions and Listing Particulars
Directives on U.K. Securities Regulation and Conduct of
Business
These two Directives, adopted by the EC Council prior to the Big
Bang, were eventually incorporated by the U.K. into the FSA and other
securities conduct-of-business rules. 52 The Directives had their greatest
impact on the "Third Market," a former U.K. exchange that was phased
out of existence. 5 3 The Third Market was a limited exchange, dealing
primarily with companies incorporated in the U.K. and mineral explora-
tion companies incorporated in Ireland.'
The demise of the Third Market resulted from a condition that the
Admissions Directive imposed on companies seeking to have shares ad-
mitted for listing. This condition required that "[a] company must have
published or filed its annual accounts ... for the three financial years
146. See id art. 20(1).
147. See id art. 20(1).
148. See id. art. 20(2).
149. See id art. 23. The supplement is also subject to the requirements of this Direc-
tive. See id.
150. See id. art. 24(1).
151. See id. art. 24(2).
152. The Admissions Directive requirements were included in U.K. domestic regula-
tions under the FSA. See Company Law, supra note 5, at 36. The Listing Particulars
requirements are embodied in U.K. law via Part IV of the FSA, and in the structure of
the U.K. securities industry via the "yellowbook" (the ISE rulebook). See The Likeli-
hood of a Simplified Route to Public Listing Remains Elusive, Fin. Times, Mar. 28, 1991,
§ 1, at 31, col. 1, 1; see also Note, Survey of Registration and Disclosure Requirements in
International Securities Markets, 9 Mich. Y.B. Int'l Legal Stud. 243, 244-247 (1988)
(summarizing the U.K. regulatory scheme governing the admission to listing of securities
on the ISE and particulars requirements); Bloomenthal, supra note 1, § 1.08(2)(c) (same).
153. See Fitzsimons, EC Directives Change Securities Markets, Fin. Times, Feb. 15,
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File, at *I [hereinafter Directives Change
Securities].
154. See H. Bloomenthal, supra note 1, § 1.08(2)(a).
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preceding the application for official listing."'"5 The ISE requirement,
however, was five years. The Unlisted Securities Market ("USM"), the
second largest exchange in the U.K., had a three-year requirement, while
the Third Market had a one-year requirement. 5 6 When the ISE dropped
its requirement to three years,' 5 7 the USM dropped its requirement to
two years. The Third Market, with its one-year requirement, simply be-
came unnecessary. 158 Since January 11, 1990 new companies have not
been admitted to the Third Market, 5 9 and companies presently on that
exchange will have the opportunity to be admitted on the USM.16°
In contrast to the lowering of some U.K. exchanges' admission stan-
dards, the overall level of information to be disclosed under these Direc-
tives has increased.' 6 ' This is viewed as largely the result of both the
general and ongoing disclosure requirements of the Listing Particulars
Directive. 162
B. Proposed Directives
A primary goal of the EC in creating the single market is for financial
services to be offered freely across the EC, in a manner that both pro-
motes the financial system and protects investors.'63 While the Proposed
Investment Services Directive and the Proposed Capital Adequacy Di-
rective represent the major efforts of the EC in this area, the U.K. has
155. Admissions Directive, supra note 118, at 26, sched. A(I)(3).
156. See generally H. Bloomenthal, supra note 1, § 1.08 (discussing the prior trading
requirement of these three U.K. exchanges).
157. The five year ISE prior trading requirement would put the ISE at a competitive
disadvantage compared to other EC exchanges in attracting foreign companies to list on
the ISE. See ISE Proposes Restructuring of Primary Markets, Fin. Reg. Rep., Nov. 1989,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File, at *2 [hereinafter ISE Proposes Restruc-
turing]; see also Directives Change Securities, supra note 153, at *2 ("the [ISE] would need
to move from a five-year [trading] history requirement to a three-year history require-
ment in order to remain competitive in attracting foreign companies with Stock Ex-
changes in other countries"). This drop in prior trading history was also grounded in
fairness reasons. U.K. domestic companies were still required to meet the ISE five-year
requirement, while other EC companies could attain an ISE listing after only three years.
See id.
158. This was not necessarily an onerous result. The Third Market, unlike the USM,
is considered a failure as a market. See Waters, Misgivings on USM Entry Changes, Fin.
Times, Nov. 1, 1989, § 1, at 12, col. 4, 4 [hereinafter Misgivings]; see also ISE Proposes
Restructuring, supra note 157, at *3 (discussing the various proposals entertained by the
Committee on Quotations of the ISE on how to resolve the USM/Third Market prior
year requirement problem).
159. See Directives Change Securities, supra note 153, at *3.
160. See Misgivings, supra note 158, § 1, at 12, col. 5; ISE Proposes Restructuring,
supra note 157, at *4.
161. See Reid & Ballheimer, supra note 119, at 126.
162. Article 4 of the Listing Particulars Directive sets the general requirements and
Article 23 requires the ongoing disclosure of new information. See id.; see also supra
notes 138 & 149 and accompanying text (discussing Articles 4 and 23 of the Listing
Particulars Directive).
163. See Redhead, Liberalization of the European Community's Financial Services Sec-
tor, 12 Whittier L. Rev. 185, 186 (1991).
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identified several potential problems if the Directives are adopted as
written.
1. The Proposed Investment Services Directive ("ISD")
a. Goals of the ISD
The Second Banking Directive specifically allows EC-based banks
(credit institutions)-but not investment firms-to provide certain secur-
ities-related services across the EC. The EC Council designed the Invest-
ment Services Directive"' primarily to afford pure, non-bank investment
companies the same "single passport" 165 to provide securities and invest-
ment services 6 6 to EC Member States. 67 It was somewhat anomalous
and unfair to allow banks to engage freely in cross-border securities
transactions, and not to specifically allow investment firms to do the
same.168 Another purpose of the ISD is to aid the EC in forging the
single market in financial services. 16 9 In this regard, a related objective is
the liberalization of stock markets and options markets, 1 0 which would
164. Amended Council Proposal for an Investment Services Directive, 1990 OJ. (C
42/06) 7 [hereinafter ISD].
165. The "single passport" is the term used to describe the ability granted an EC firm
in one Member State to carry on investment services in any other Member State. See R.
Cranston, The Single Market and the Law of Banking 116-17 (1991).
166. The following investment services fall under the ISD: brokerage, dealing as prin-
cipal, market making, portfolio management, underwriting services with respect to trans-
ferable securities only and subsequent distribution thereof, professional investment
advice, and safekeeping and administration. See ISD, supra note 164, at 18, annex sec. A.
Unless otherwise noted above, all of the following instruments/securities can be subject
to the ISD services: transferrable securities, money market instruments including certifi-
cates of deposit and "Eurocommercial paper," financial futures and options, and ex-
change/interest rate instruments. See id. at 18, annex sec. B.
167. It is interesting to note that while the ISD specifically creates the single passport
for investment firms, their freedom to engage in cross border business in the EC already
exists under the Treaty of Rome. In this regard the ISD is unnecessary. See R. Cran-
ston, supra note 165, at 116. The ISD, however, will prove greatly helpful because it
represents a specific EC-wide agreement not to obstruct the ability to provide such serv-
ices. See id Thus, "[t]he ISD is an expression by Member States of a willingness to
comply with obligations already imposed upon them by the Treaty [of Rome] and to give
effect to freedoms which already exist under the Treaty." rd
168. The ISD is "necessary for reasons of fair competition, to ensure that non-bank
investment firms benefit from similar freedom to create branches and provide services
across frontiers as that provided for by the [Second Banking Directive]." ISD, supra note
164, para. 3; see generally Redhead, supra note 163, at 190-96 (discussing the provisions
of the Second Banking Directive).
169. See ISD, supra note 164, para. 1.
170. In order for EC firms authorized by their "home state" to conduct a Community-
wide business, access to "host-state" stock exchanges (and options markets) should be
liberalized. See id. para. 5. The terms "home state" and "host state" are used extensively
in the ISD and need to be defined. "Home state" means the EC Member State in which
the investment firm has its principal place of business (if firm is a natural person), or its
registered office/head office (if firm is a legal person). See id. art. l(4)(a)(b). "Host state"
means the EC Member in which the investment firm has a branch, or in which it supplies
services. See id. art. 1(5).
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allow EC firms broad access to investment exchanges.17 1
b. "Home-State" Authorization
Under the ISD, the "home state"'17 is charged with both authorizing a
firm to engage in investment services, and supervising the firm to ensure
its financial soundness. 73 Home-state authorization may not issue un-
less the investment firm has sufficient capital 74 and those who operate
the firm are "of sufficiently good repute and experience." 175 Further,
home states must require the applicant firm to include in its application
information about the kinds of business it will conduct as well as the
structure of the firm.176 Additionally, the home state cannot grant au-
thorization without knowing the identities of all members of the firm
possessing qualified holdings, or if it is not satisfied that those with quali-
fied holdings will further the careful management of the firm. 177
Mutual recognition by EC host states of a particular EC home state's
authorization of an investment firm will enable that firm to conduct in-
vestment activities across the entire Community, without the need to ob-
tain new authorization in each new host state.178 Mutual recognition of
home-state authorization is achieved by ISD harmonization of the vari-
ous EC Member State standards for authorization, 79 thereby making it
unnecessary for the host state to impose its own investment rules.'8 0
A Member state may impose stricter rules for firms it authorizes while
acting as a home state.' 8" In most cases, however, those same rules will
not apply to firms authorized elsewhere, because of the policy of mutual
recognition. 182
171. See R. Cranston, supra note 165, at 132.
172. For the definition of "home state" and related terms, see supra note 170.
173. See ISD, supra note 164, para. 6; art. 3(1).
174. See id. art. 3(2). This capital amount is to be determined according to the nature
of the service to be provided, and will be specifically referenced under the Capital Ade-
quacy Directive. See id.; see also infra notes 231-43 and accompanying text (for analysis
of capital requirements under the Capital Adequacy Directive).
175. ISD, supra note 164, art. 3(2).
176. See id. art. 3(3).
177. See id. art. 4. A qualified holding is defined as 10% or greater of the capital or
voting rights in the firm, or a holding in the firm that allows the exercise of significant
influence over its management. See id. art. 1(7).
178. See 1d. paras. 2 & 8.
179. See id. para. 2.
180. See id.; see also supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text (discussing harmoniza-
tion, which bears on the EC objective that home-state authorization will be acceptable to
host states).
181. See ISD, supra note 164, para. 7. This is so because the EC "Commission's ap-
proach [under the ISD] is one of 'minimum harmonisation,'" which allows the home
state to "impose prudential rules [on its own firms] which are stricter than those laid
down by the ISD." R. Cranston, supra note 165, at 117.
182. Host states cannot make home-state authorized firms "subject to an authorization
requirement or to a requirement to provide endowment capital or any measure having
equivalent effect." ISD, supra note 164, art. 12(2). In general, under the ISD the host
S306 [Vol. 60
U.K. SECURITIES INDUSTRY REFORM
c. Instances of "Host-State" Control
Nevertheless, there are several instances under the ISD where host-
state rules and authority apply to a home-state-authorized firm con-
ducting investment business within the host-state borders. In those situa-
tions the policy of mutual recognition does not apply.
Article 16(2) of the ISD makes a broad reference to "the legal provi-
sions adopted in [the host] State pursuant to the provisions of this Direc-
tive involving powers of the host Member State."'8 3 The first of these
host-state powers allows the host state to require compliance with its
own laws in two cases: (1) where a firm is not authorized as an invest-
ment firm in its home state, and (2) where investment activities that fall
outside the ISD are conducted by the firm, even if the firm has home-
state authorization."' However, such host-state power exists only if host
laws are compatible with Community law and protect the general good,
and if there are no equivalent rules over these firms or activities in the
home state." 5 A second host-state power over a home-state-authorized
investment firm allows the host Member State to verify that the firm con-
forms with its laws and principles as to administrative and accounting
procedures, and that it exercises sutfficient internal control." 6
A third source of rule-making authority for the host state over the
home-state-authorized investment firm is found in Article 11 of the
ISD' 1 7 The tenor of Article 11 is an order to home-state authorities to
devise prudential rules that must be followed by all investment firms they
authorize, whether the firm is to be a branch in the host state or will only
provide services into the host state.188 One such required rule regards
compensation schemes for investors.' 9 In the case of a branch estab-
lished in the host state, however, the branch must follow the host-state
rules as to compensation schemes until the substance of such schemes
can be harmonized. 9"
Article 13(2) is a fourth instance of host-state control over investment
firms authorized elsewhere in the EC.'9 ' Article 13(1) obligates host
state's ability to impose rules on home-state authorized firms is very limited. See RL
Cranston, supra note 165, at 117.
183. ISD, supra note 164, art. 16(2).
184. See id. para. 10. The language here first appears to indicate that such host-state
laws or regulations have to be followed only if the firm is neither authorized in the home
state nor engaging in activities beyond the ISD. However, the phrase "such firms or such
activities" appears later in the same provision. Id. This lends credence to the view that
the words "such activities" refer to authorized firms as well as unauthorized firms.
185. See id.
186. See id. para. 15.
187. See id. art. 11.
188. See id. art. 11(1), indents 1-7. Note that this is an example of an effort to harmo-
nize in the area of financial services; the aim here is to have all EC Member States force
the firms they authorize to comply with these specific mandates.
189. See id. art. 11(1), indent 4.
190. See id.
191. See id. art. 13(2).
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states to open membership in their stock exchanges, securities markets,
and settlement systems to home-state-authorized firms allowed to engage
in brokering, dealing, or market-making.192 In this context, membership
"shall be on the basis that the rules governing the structure and organiza-
tion of the relevant host stock exchange or organized securities market
and clearing and settlement systems are complied with."'' 9
3
A fifth source of host-state power over home-state-authorized firms is
in the area of advertising. The investment firm is subject to any host-
state rules concerning the form and the content of advertising. Such
rules, however, must be enacted in the interest of the general good. 194
Finally, the ISD allows the host state to exercise authority in circum-
stances involving the "general good." While the standard of mutual rec-
ognition of home-state authorization requires that host states not
interfere with authorized activities, this is only to the extent that the ac-
tivities are not counter to host-state legal provisions that protect the gen-
eral good.' 95
Further, Article 16 of the ISD affords a remedy for the host state when
an investment firm, whether having a branch in the state or merely pro-
viding services into the state, fails to comply with ISD-sanctioned host-
state rules. Article 16(2) of the ISD states that the host state "shall re-
quire the investment firm concerned to put an end to the irregular situa-
tion." 19 6 If the firm fails to comply, the host state must then inform the
authorities in the firm's home state of the firm's failure to comply.
Thereafter, the home state must ensure that the firm complies with the
host-state rule.' 19 If the firm continues to violate the rules of the host
state, the host state can, upon notice to the home state, take action to
punish the firm and prevent it from engaging in any further business.' 98
The foregoing procedure need not be followed, however, where the in-
vestment firm is in violation of host-state rules designed to protect the
general good, or in the case of an emergency where action must be taken
to protect investors. In these cases the host state may take whatever
measures are needed to prevent the violations or to protect investors. 199
192. See id. art. 13(1).
193. Id. art. 13(2).
194. Id. art. 16(10).
195. See id. para. 11. A particular instance of this broad power is found in Article
14(4) where, in the interest of the "general good" the host state may impose conditions
upon the branch of a home-state authorized investment firm. See id. art. 14(4).
196. Id. art. 16(2).
197. See id. art. 16(3).
198. See id. art. 16(4). Note that the investment firm must be notified of any sanction
exacted on it, and the sanction must be explained. Further, the firm may appeal any
sanction to the courts of the Member State that imposed it. See id. art. 16(6).
199. See id. art. 16(5)(7).
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d. "'Home-State" Imposition of Conditions on Authorized
Investment Firms
Under the ISD, the home state is charged with ensuring that the firms
it has authorized comply with several conditions. One such condition is
contained in Article 8, which specifies that an authorized firm's initial
required capital not fall below the amount required for authorization."X
The home state, however, may allow time for a firm that falls below its
required amount to increase its capital to an acceptable level."° A sec-
ond condition is simply that the firm must continue to comply with those
standards needed for initial authorization-namely, sufficient capital as
per the services provided, and the good repute of the firm's directors. 2"
A third condition under the ISD regards qualified holdings. The home
state must require that prior notice be given to the competent authorities
by a natural or legal person any time that person hopes to: (1) gain a
qualified holding in a firm; (2) increase an existent qualified holding in a
firm;20 3 or (3) dispose of or decrease a qualified holding.20 Furthermore,
the firm itself must give the home state notice of changes in qualified
holdings as soon as it becomes aware of such changes. It must also sup-
ply the names of those natural or legal persons with qualified holdings,
and the sizes of the holdings, on a yearly basis." 5
The home state must also draw up "prudential rules" that authorized
firms must follow. These rules relate to: administration and accounting,
separation of investors' securities and money from that of the firm, com-
pensation in case of firm bankruptcy or default, provision of information
upon home-state demand, record-keeping, and conflicts of interest.20 6
e. Requirements upon "Host States"
Once a firm is authorized by its home state, the host state must ensure
that the firm may freely provide services within its borders, whether
through a branch located in the host state or through provision of serv-
ices into the state.2 7 As noted above, the host state cannot impose any
additional authorization requirements." 8 Also, as described above, there
is a broad mandate that duly authorized firms be allowed equal access to
the various financial markets and exchanges within the host state to
200. See id. art. 8(1)(2) & (4).
201. See id. art. 8(5).
202. See id art. 9. These requirements are set out initially in Article 3(2).
203. See id art. 10(1).
204. See id. art. 10(3).
205. See id art. 10(4).
206. See ic art. 11(1). Note that the home state may chose not to apply some of these
rules when a firm deals with professional investors, or where the firm will not handle the
money or securities of its client. See id art. 11(2).
207. See id. art. 12(1).
208. See id art. 12(2); see also supra note 182 (discussing this general requirement).
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which domestic firms have access.2°9
f. Branching of Authorized Firms
Under the ISD a distinction is made between an EC home-state-au-
thorized firm that merely provides services into the host state, and a firm
that is operating as a branch in the host state.210 There is a definite pro-
cedure under the ISD that must be followed in order for an authorized
firm to branch.21' First, the firm must notify its home state that it wishes
to branch into another EC nation.21 2 When providing such notice, the
firm must include information regarding the target host state, the type of
business to be undertaken, the organization of the branch, its address in
the host state, and the names of the branch managers.21 a The home state
then has three months in which to decide whether to convey this infor-
mation, plus information as to the amount of funds in the investment
firm, to the host state. If it decides that the financial and administrative
capacities of the firm are inadequate, however, it need not do so. 214 In
the event of refusal-which operates as a denial to branch into the host
state-the home state must explain to the firm within those three months
the reason(s) why the information was not forwarded. 215
Once the information is conveyed to the host state, the host state has
two months to: (1) prepare for the supervision of the firm, according to
the extent of its ability to impose conditions under the ISD;216 and (2)
indicate the conditions devised in regard to the public good that it will
impose on the branch.217 The firm may establish the branch upon notice
from the host state, or upon expiration of the two-month period, which-
ever occurs first.218
g. Value of the ISD to the U.K.
The ISD is of great importance to the U.K. because the British securi-
ties service industry is comprised of many pure investment firms.
209. See ISD, supra note 164, art. 13. See generally R. Cranston, supra note 165, at
132 (discussing ISD ordered access to stock exchanges and other securities markets).
210. A branch is defined as "a place of business which forms a legally dependent part
of an investment firm and which provides an investment service for which the investment
firm has been authorized." ISD, supra note 164, art. 1(6).
211. The procedure involved where an investment firm authorized in the home state
merely wants to provide services into the host state is far simpler. See R. Cranston, supra
note 165, at 134. In these cases the firm must notify the home state of the services it
hopes to provide, and the home state has one month to send that notification on to the
host state. See ISD, supra note 164, art. 15.
212. See ISD, supra note 164, art. 14(1).
213. See id. art. 14(2).
214. See id. art. 14(3).
215. See id. The firm may have recourse in the home-state courts upon the home
state's refusal or failure to notify. See id.
216. See id. art. 14(4). See generally supra notes 183-95 and accompanying text (for
listing of the powers afforded the host state over home-state authorized firms).
217. See ISD, supra note 164, art. 14(4).
218. See id. art. 14(5).
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Whereas other EC states rely on banks for investment services, which
obtain their "single passport" via the Second Banking Directive, the
U.K. industry derives cross-border trading benefits primarily from the
ISD.2 9 This aspect of the ISD responds to the U.K.'s concern that al-
lowing other EC banks access to U.K. securities business, while not per-
mitting U.K. securities firms to solicit business in other EC states, would
be grossly unfair and destructive to the U.K. investment industry.' 0
h. U.K. Concerns About the ISD
While the ISD will likely equalize pure investment firms with banks in
the EC investment services market, the U.K. is nevertheless troubled that
its own national firms will remain at a competitive disadvantage in com-
parison to other EC firms. This is the result of relatively strict U.K.
conduct-of-business rules under the FSA that apply to U.K. "home-
state" firms, regardless of the EC state in which they seek to do busi-
ness." 1 Compounding this adverse effect on U.K.-authorized firms is the
fact that EC firms operating in the U.K. itself will not be subject to many
of these rules because they operate under their home-state requirements,
which are likely to be less exacting. Thus U.K. firms are also at a com-
petitive disadvantage within the U.K. itself. 2
Yet another misgiving is that U.K. firms, and other foreign firms, will
relocate to Member States with comparatively less demanding invest-
ment rules. Thus, the EC harmonization in the area of financial services
may lead to a decrease in regulatory standards rather than an increase in
the effectiveness of regulation.'
219. See Blair, supra note 108, at 113-14. "Many... large securities businesses in
Germany and France are bank owned, so they will get their passport from the second
banking directive. But in the UK many securities firms are not bank owned and so need
the investment services passport before they can sell their services elsewhere in the EC."
Inside the City: EC Threat to UK Financial Services Firms, Independent, Sept. 17, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File, at * I [hereinafter EC Threat].
220. See EC Threat, supra note 219, at *1.
221. See Company Law, supra note 5, at 20; Reid & Ballheimer, supra note 119, at
116.
222. See Company Law, supra note 5, at 20. Some feel, however, that such a disadvan-
tage to any Member State firm will not be that taxing. "It is probable that some Member
States will have rules which are stricter than the minimum required [under the ISD], but
competitive forces will probably lead to pressure for change upon those states which are
... overly restrictive." R. Cranston, supra note 165, at 117.
223. See Rider, supra note 24, at 186-87. The fear is that there could be a proliferation
of "investment firms in Member States with the least strict conduct of business rules and
least strict prudential controls." Reid & Ballheimer, supra note 119, at 116. This fear
may be countered somewhat by the ISD, however, which requires that authorization be
denied to a firm where it is clear that it has chosen the legal system of another Member
State simply because it is less stringent than the state where it intends to conduct most of
its business. See ISD, supra note 164, para. 4.
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2. The Proposed Capital Adequacy Directive ("CAD")
a. Goals of the CAD
The Capital Adequacy Directive224 is intended almost as a corollary to
the ISD.225 While the ISD coordinated and harmonized rules regarding
investment services, it left coordination of capital requirements of those
firms to another Directive.2 26 The CAD harmonizes the minimum capi-
tal reserves that an investment firm must maintain in order to engage in
cross-border securities business.227 As such, some believe capital ade-
quacy to be the crucial element in actually gaining a single EC market in
investment services."' In order for such capital adequacy requirements
to effectively protect investors, however, the regulations must broadly
cover all the risks associated with the industry.2 29
Towards the formation of the single financial market within the EC,
this Directive has several objectives: (1) to establish uniform amounts of
initial capital; (2) to harmonize standards for the "own funds" of invest-
ment firms; and (3) to harmonize standards for monitoring market
risks.23
0
b. Initial Capital Required for Investment Firms
The initial capital required of investment firms under the CAD is ECU
500,000.231 This amount drops to ECU 100,000 for investment firms
224. See Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on Capital Adequacy of Invest-
ment Firms and Credit Institutions, 1990 O.J. (C 152/6) 12 [hereinafter, Capital Ade-
quacy]. Note that some provisions of this Directive apply to credit institutions as well as
investment firms. Such aspects of the Directive have been left out of the following analy-
sis, as matters relating to credit institutions are beyond the scope of this discussion.
225. See EC Pressed on Capital Adequacy, Independent, Feb. 19, 1990, available In
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File, at * 1 [hereinafter EC Pressed]. The Capital Adequacy
Directive makes specific reference to the ISD in several of its provisions. See Capital
Adequacy, supra note 224, paras. 1 & 2.
226. See id. paras. 1 & 2.
227. See Reid & Ballheimer, supra note 119, at 117. "In the proposed Capital Ade-
quacy Directive, the Commission intends that capital adequacy requirements for firms
covered by the proposed Investment Services Directive be harmonized." Id.
228. See Ewing, The Single Market of 1992: Implications for Banking and Investment
Services in the EC, 13 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 453, 465 (1990).
229. See Dale, supra note 21, at xii.
230. See Capital Adequacy supra note 224, para. 3. "Own funds" under the Capital
Adequacy Directive can be defined in two ways for investment firms: the definition in the
Own Funds Directive, Council Directive 89/299, 1989 O.J. (L 124) 16, or the definition
contained in the Capital Adequacy Directive itself, found in annex VI(4). See id. art. 2,
indent 16. A useful definition is "the... institution's own capital, including items which
may be treated as capital under national rules." Reid & Ballheimer, supra note 119, at
106 n.20 (citing the First Banking Directive, Council Directive 77/780, 1977 O.J. (L 322)
30).
231. See Capital Adequacy, supra note 224, art. 3(2). See generally Spicers Centre for
Europe, Opportunities in European Financial Services: 1992 and Beyond xiii (P.
Quantock ed. 1990) [hereinafter 1992 and Beyond] (discussing initial capital require-
ments).
Note that the firms covered by this article of the CAD are those that are not credit
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that hold customers' securities or funds while acting as agents, but that
do not hold trading positions. 232 The amount drops further, to ECU
50,000, for firms that are not authorized by their home state to hold cus-
tomers' securities or funds, to act as market makers, or to underwrite.
This amount is also applied to firms that underwrite, but only to the
extent that they distribute issues on "a best efforts basis."1,1 3
There are two exceptions to the initial capital requirements. First,
firms existing prior to the implementation of the CAD may continue to
be authorized by the home state even if their own funds do not meet the
required initial capital amounts.' This, however, is subject to limita-
tions. The firm's own funds" 5 at the time this Directive is implemented
cannot fall below the highest amount recorded after that time." 6 Fur-
ther, the exception does not apply where the control of the firm changes
hands, other than through an inheritance. 7
The second exception to the initial capital requirements under this Di-
rective is for mergers of investment firms. The resulting firm's exemp-
tion, however, is subject to approval of the home-state authorities."
Note that the own funds of the new firm cannot fall below the highest
amount achieved after the merger."
There is a general prohibition under the CAD that a firm's own funds
not fall below its initial capital requirement. If own funds do fall below
the required amount, the home-state authorities may choose to give the
firm time to raise the funds back to a sufficient level. If it fails to do so
within that time, the firm must cease conducting business.2"o
c. "Own Funds" and Market Risks
Under the CAD, investment firms are required to maintain their own
funds at a level adequate to cover the market risks associated with vari-
institutions, those whose business is not confined to the giving investment advice, and
those that are not "local firms." See Capital Adequacy, supra note 224, art. 3(l). A local
firm is a firm that deals "only for its own account on a financial futures or options ex-
change." Id art. 2, indent 13.
"ECU" stands for European currency unit. The ECU is the "denominator... for the
[European Monetary System] exchange rate mechanism." A. Swan & J. Murphy, supra
note 108, at 842. Under this system, each Member State agrees to set an official rate for
its currency, and to maintain that rate within a narrow range by participation in the
exchange market. Thus the European Monetary System achieves the close monetary co-
operation within the EC and, in conjunction with the ECU, has stabilized intra-EC ex-
change rates. This is viewed as essential to the formation of the EC single market. See id
232. See Capital Adequacy, supra note 224, art. 3(4).
233. See id art. 3(3).
234. See il art. 3(5).
235. For a definition of the own funds requirement, see supra note 230.
236. See Capital Adequacy, supra note 224, art. 3(5).
237. See id art. 3(6).
238. See id art. 3(7).
239. See id
240. See id art. 3(8).
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ous investment activities.24 The sum of the amounts of own funds to be
devoted to particular risks is the overall own-funds requirement for that
firm. The firm must ensure that this required amount is less than, or
equal to, the own funds in its possession.242 Furthermore, home-state
authorities must require investment firms to maintain own-funds levels
necessary to counter the risks associated with activities that are permit-
ted by the ISD, but not covered by the CAD. Risk from activities not
covered by the ISD must also be covered by the firm's own funds.243
d. Reporting Requirements
Investment firms shall provide all the information that the home-state
authorities need to determine whether the firm is complying with the
terms of the CAD. 2' Furthermore, there is a specific timetable under
which such information is to be supplied. Firms that are authorized by
the home state to act as principals must report to the home-state authori-
ties at least once each month. For firms that act as agents or portfolio
managers, the reporting period is no less than once every three months.
Firms that are not authorized to retain customers' securities or funds, to
act as market makers, or to engage in underwriting must report to the
home-state authorities at least once each year. Finally, firms that under-
write, but do so only for a distribution of issues on a "best efforts basis,"
are also subject to the yearly reporting requirement.245
e. U.K. Concerns About the CAD
The U.K. anxiety here is that the minimum amounts set out under the
CAD for investment firms are higher than the U.K. domestic require-
ment. U.K. firms would have to either meet the higher standard under
the Directive or go out of business, because they cannot engage in invest-
ment business if they fail to maintain adequate capital.246 This concern is
especially significant in light of the fact that the Big Bang and the adop-
tion of the FSA created an environment that fostered the birth of many
firms.247 The U.K. is also troubled that the levels of required capital will
241. See id. art. 4(1). The risks are set out in annexes I-IV. See id. at 12-16. See
generally Reid & Ballheimer, supra note 119, at 118 (discussing the four types of risks set
out in the Proposed Capital Adequacy Directive).
242. See Capital Adequacy, supra note 224, art. 4(1).
243. See id. art. 4(2).
244. See id. art. 6(l).
245. See id. art. 6(2).
246. See EC Pressed, supra note 225, at *1. Proposed levels were far too high accord-
ing to Lord Elton, Chairman of the Financial Intermediaries, Managers and Brokers
Regulatory Association, and other securities officials in the U.K.. See id. But see Capital
Adequacy, supra note 224, art. 3(5) (firms in existence prior to the Capital Adequacy
Directive may be authorized by the home state even if they fail to meet the minimum
capital amounts).
247. See Solomon & Corso, The Impact of Technology on the Trading of Securities: The
Emerging Global Market and the Implications for Regulation, 24 J. Marshall L. Rev. 299,
315-16 (1991).
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cause a loss in international securities trading in the EC as a whole, 248 as
EC firms would be required to meet greater capital levels than competing
investment firms outside the EC.249
III: SEAQ AND THE EC EFFORTS TO DEVISE A UNIFIED STOCK
QUOTATIONS SYSTEM
SEAQ, as a means of trading securities, was itself a reform of the Big
Bang intended to increase liquidity in the U.K. markets. ° SEAQ was
also designed to put London in the forefront of cross-border trading in
securities.251 As one expert has noted, a computerized, automated, and
"screen based system [of trading] ... which did not depend on the geo-
graphical location of the members using it (as did any system that de-
pended on [a] trading floor) held an enormous potential advantage for
the [London Stock Exchange]... to establish itself as the premier stock
exchange for the trading of international securities."1 2
While there have been certain criticisms of the system," 3 it has put the
ISE and London far ahead of the competition in the global securities
market.2 1 In regard to the EC attempt to forge a single market in secur-
ities, other EC states are concerned about this U.K.-SEAQ dominance in
international securities trading.25
One such effort to create a single EC securities market was called
"Euroquote," an EC-backed idea for a Community-wide real-time stock
quotations system to which all EC States could have access. 56 However,
248. See Reid & Ballheimer, supra note 119, at 117. In regard to the Capital Ade-
quacy Directive, "[tlhe United Kingdom's government expressed the fear that interna-
tional securities trading would be driven outside the Community as a result of an earlier
proposal by the European Commission, which, by ... favoring universal banks, could
have discriminated against firms that conduct securities business in separate companies."
Id
249. See 1992 and Beyond, supra note 231, at 140.
250. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. See generally N. Poser, supra note 1,
at 43 (for how stocks are traded and priced through SEAQ).
251. See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 42.
252. Id.
253. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
254. See Five Years, supra note 67, at 26. SEAQ International handles "up to half the
turnover in big French and Italian shares and a quarter of... big German shares." Id.
Further, because of SEAQ, "London now accounts for some 90% of all global cross-
border share deals." Id.
255. See Inside the City: Secure Future for SEAQ is Vital to City's Well-Being, In-
dependent, Dec. 3, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File, at * I [hereinafter
Secure Future]. SEAQ's "success has not gone unnoticed by London's rivals, such as
Paris, led by Regis Rousselle, president of the Societe des Bourses Francaises and Frank-
furt, where Rudiger von Rosen is vice-chairman of the Federation of German Stock Ex-
changes." Id.
256. See generally European Update: Main Text Banking and Financial Ser'vices, 1991
WL 11696, available in WESTLAW, International Library, Eurupdate File, § 6.6.2.
[hereinafter 1991 WL 11696] (describing Euroquote).
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the idea has been abandoned by the EC.2 57 Euroquote was actually a
Brussels company 258 charged with implementing the project, which in-
volved linking together EC states' computerized trading systems.259 It
was intended to be "the vehicle for a comprehensive European trading
system.' ' 21° Moreover, it was also to carry information about companies
to be listed on EC exchanges.261
The value of a unified system is obvious: the EC is moving towards the
single market, and a system such as Euroquote would enable Member
States to obtain the same information at the same time. Furthermore, a
unified quotation system for the single market will likely increase inter-
national investing in the EC markets.262 A single EC market for securi-
ties, and a unified stock market, will also likely increase infusion of
foreign capital into the EC.263
Within the framework of the Euroquote system, the U.K. wanted to
extend SEAQ to all Member States. Thus the U.K. system would be-
come the EC single market quotations system. 2 4 SEAQ International
already handles a global business and has an international trading capac-
ity, and the U.K. does not want to lose this growing business.265
France and other EC States, however, were hesitant to allow the U.K.
system to branch out in such a manner.266 Therefore, the French posed
257. See European Bourses Slowly Forging Closer Links, Reuters, Nov. 20, 1991, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File, at * 1 [hereinafter Closer Links].
258. See Secure Future, supra note 255, at *2.
259. See 1991 WL 11696, supra note 256, at § 6.6.2..
260. Secure Future, supra note 255, at * 1 (quoting the Federation of German Stock
Exchanges).
261. See id. at *2. This aspect of Euroquote was subject to EC dispute. The executive
vice-chairman of the Federation of German Stock Exchanges stated that there was no
German demand for Euroquote to carry only information. See Waters, Securities Chiefs
Split as Deadline Looms, Fin. Times, Apr. 23, 1991, § 1, at 29, col. 5, 5 [hereinafter
Securities Chiefs]. In his opinion, "'the obvious need remains for a European settlement
system.'" Id. (quoting Rudiger von Rosen, executive vice-chairman of the Federation of
German Stock Exchanges).
262. See Frustration, Confusion Reign as Policy Deadline Nears, Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep.,
June 17, 1991, at 5 [hereinafter Policy Deadline]. The disparity between the EC markets,
including trading practices and settlement procedures, actually drives away potential in-
vestors. See id. (citing view of Andrew Hugh Smith, chairman of the ISE).
263. See id. at 5; 1991 WL 11696, supra note 256, at § 6.6.1..
264. See Secure Future, supra note 255, at *2. "If a commercial case is made for mak-
ing Euroquote into a trading system it could possibly incorporate S[EAQ] International."
Id. This is in keeping with the original goals in implementing SEAQ. See N. Poser,
supra note 1, at 42. The U.K. recognized that such an option would be confronted by
political barriers, because SEAQ is fully an English operation. See Secure Future, supra
note 255, at *2.
265. See generally Secure Future, supra note 255, at *1-*2 (for discussion on impor-
tance of SEAQ to U.K. securities industry and fear of losing business as a result of other
options being adopted for the Euroquote Project). See also Five Years, supra note 67, at
26 (highlighting amount of international securities trading done through SEAQ).
266. Some say that the U.K. was not so concerned with the unified market as it was
with advancing SEAQ. See 1991 WL 11696, supra note 256, at § 6.6.2.. But see Policy
Deadline, supra note 262, at 5 (in regard to the EC forging a single stock quotations
system and securities market, the SEAQ system is "'an excellent base from which to
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an alternative plan of their own called "Eurolist,"267 which, after the
failure of Euroquote, has become the focus of EC efforts in this area.2
This system would allow EC exchanges to have their own quotations
system, with foreign companies listed on them as well.269 Thus, all EC
exchanges could share in the trading of each company's stock,17 1 while
"remain[ing] the main centre of liquidity in its own domestic shares." 17
A further benefit to this system is that local investors would be able to
conduct international securities transactions within a familiar system.272
A drawback to Eurolist, however, is that it will not carry news about
listed companies-a feature previously planned for Euroquote2 "3
Despite the dissolution of Euroquote, implementing the U.K. SEAQ
system in some capacity might allow the EC to avoid spending funds on
an entirely new system,' and the cost of expanding SEAQ might justifi-
ably fall on the U.K., which has the most to gain from its acceptance.
On the other hand, while France's Eurolist concept comports more with
the EC policy of Community-wide participation, its reliance on national
trading systems appears to be adverse to the EC objective of a single
securities market.
CONCLUSION
The U.K. implemented sweeping domestic changes in its securities in-
dustry via the Big Bang and the FSA. The EC Directives regarding se-
curities, designed to move the EC toward the single market planned for
1992, have fostered additional changes in the U.K. investment sector.
Previous Directives have required adjustment of the laws and conduct-
of-business rules in the markets of EC Member States, specifically effect-
start. The statistics show that [U.K.] markets transact around 90 percent of all cross-
border business in the European Community.... Around two-thirds of business done on
SEAQ International is in European shares. This success is due to the liquidity offered to
investors, usually much greater than is available in European national markets. This
attracts business which would never be done in the absence of this kind of liquidity' ")
(citing Andrew Hugh Smith, chairman of the ISE).
267. See 1991 WL 11696, supra note 256, at § 6.6.3..
268. See European Bourses Study New Euro Trading System, Reuters, Aug. 21, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File, at * 1 [hereinafter New Euro Trading
System].
269. See 1991 WL 11696, supra note 256, at § 6.6.3.; see also Closer Links, supra note
257, at * 1 (" 'Eurolist' [will] facilitate multiple share listings on EC bourses for big Euro-
pean companies").
270. See 1991 WL 11696, supra note 256, at § 6.6.3..
271. Securities Chiefs, supra note 261, § 1, at 30, col. 7 (citing view of Jean-Francois
Theodore, chairman and chief executive of the Paris Bourse).
272. See 1991 WL 11696, supra note 256, at § 6.6.3.. But see Financial Services and
the Single Market A UK View, Fin. Reg. Rep., Sept. 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Omni File, at *2 [hereinafter UK View] (the U.K. has noted that consumer pref-
erence for local firms and systems is a barrier to formation of the single market).
273. See New Euro Trading System, supra note 268, at * 1.
274. For example, if the EC had decided on Euroquote, and wanted a completely new
computerized trading system under that format, the cost would have been approximately
ECU 15 million. See Secure Future, supra note 255, at *2.
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ing the exchange structure and disclosure requirements in the U.K..
Present Directives will likely necessitate further changes. The U.K. has
concluded that change, with movement toward a successful single EC
market, will be of national benefit.275
If the U.K. can move beyond current misgivings generated by the
newer Directives,276 and if some accord can be reached among the EC as
to a unified quotation system, all Members should experience an increase
in cross-border investment. Furthermore, investment in both U.K. and
other Members' issues by non-EC investors will likely increase when se-
curities and financial markets are fully harmonized. 7
275. See UK View, supra note 272, at *1. This was the conclusion of the all-party
Committee of the House of Commons Trade and Industry. See id. Such change, how-
ever, is likely a necessity. U.K. cooperation with other EC markets, as well as coopera-
tion with other foreign exchanges and markets, is vital as securities markets continue to
engage in transnational business. See Note, supra note 30, at 382.
276. See supra notes 221-23 & 246-49 and accompanying text. Note that there are
various other obstacles standing in the way of the single market that need to be overcome
by both the EC and the U.K.. These include exchange controls, domestic regulations
concerning financial services, tax and currency variations, consumer preferences for local
firms, takeover protection, and the EC merger policy. See UK View, supra note 272, at
"2-*3.
277. The ISE Chairman himself has stressed increased unity among EC states, so as to
attract those foreign customers that are likely avoiding investment in the Euromarkets
because of the variations among trading practices and markets. See Policy Deadline,
supra note 262, at 5.
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